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Between patronage and good 
governance: organizational 
arrangements in (local) public 
appointment processes 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates whether certain organizational arrangements in (local) 
public appointment processes could encourage the use of appointments as a tool 
of good governance rather than as a tool of patronage. Specifically, we studied 
the role of six organizational arrangements in ten case studies of intra- and inter-
organizational public appointment processes held in Italian local government. We 
found that good governance (in terms of perception of overall integrity and 
fairness) was found in processes of public appointments where there was 
independent scrutiny, and when the process involved local councillors and/or 
external stakeholders — that is, actors beyond those with the formal power to 
appoint. In these cases, making appointments was seen as a tool of good 
governance rather than of patronage. These organizational arrangements were 
more relevant than other ones such as transparency of public advertisements, 
job descriptions and educational/professional requirements, media and public 
awareness. The paper describes the relevant literature, the research study and 
discusses implications for research, policy and management. 
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Points for practitioners 
In terms of policy implications, the article discusses the importance of ensuring 
transparency and some form of checks and balances in the power of making 
public appointments as well as of promoting more awareness among citizens and 
the society in general on the issue of public appointments. From a managerial 
point of view, the article suggests that public managers should consider the 
implications of the different organizational arrangements that can be used in 
public appointment processes to exploit the good governance potential of public 
appointments. 
 
Keywords 
Public appointments, local government, public managers, politicians, good 
governance, public governance, patronage, Italy, corruption 
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Introduction 
This article focuses on the use of public appointments in Italian local government 
organizations—specifically analysing the role of different organizational 
arrangements that have been used in intra- and inter-organizational processes. 
 Several recent phenomena have increased the relevance of public 
appointments. For example, some reforms inspired by New Public Management 
and New Public Governance (Carboni, 2010; Klijn, 2012; Meneguzzo et al., 2013) 
resulted at the local level in the growth of municipal corporations (Grossi and 
Reichard, 2008), of the so-called quangos (Van Thiel, 2001; Payne and Skelcher, 
1997) and/or of public agencies (Verhoest et al., 2012) and more generally in the 
creation of many hybrid organizations (Skelcher et al., 2013; Grossi and 
Thomasson, 2015; Denis et al., 2015). 
 This trend has been labelled variously, such as the ‘hollowing out of the state’ 
(Rhodes, 1994), ‘the appointed state’ (Skelcher, 1998) or ’distributed public 
governance (e.g., Flinders, 2004; OECD, 2002). Whatever the label, the effect 
has been that potential places and opportunities for making public appointments 
have been extended, contributing to what has been described by Vibert (2007) 
as ‘the rise of the unelected’. As Watson (2004: 1) noted, the current situation of 
the public sector in several countries is that there are many appointed people 
who manage a huge amount of public money and make decisions that 
considerably impact citizens’ lives. 
 Given this backdrop, the ways in which public appointments are managed 
represent an intriguing and relevant issue. Many authors (e.g., Bresler-Gonen, 
2007; Dahlström, 2009; Di Mascio, 2012a; Kopecký, 2011; Kopecký et al., 2012; 
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Mayntz and Derlien, 1989; Scherlis, 2009) have approached the topic of public 
appointments from a political science perspective, studying – among other factors 
– the motivations for making public appointments and/or the behaviours of 
politicians and parties in making appointments, and focusing mainly on central 
governments. However, according to Flinders et al. (2012: 511-513), more 
detailed studies are needed on this topic, especially from a public management 
and governance perspective1 (McTavish and Piper, 2007: 146). 
 In this article, we aim to contribute to closing this gap. Specifically, we follow 
the work of Flinders et al. (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012), which highlighted some 
conditions that can allow appointments to be used as a tool of good governance 
rather than a tool of ‘pork barrel’ politics, ‘which is based on the exploitation of 
government funds to garner support in specific electoral constituencies’ (Flinders 
et al., 2012: 513). 
 Good governance is a very broad and value-laden concept often used 
normatively to promote certain actions by governments (Bouckaert and Van de 
Walle 2003) and/or to mark a distinction from practices of bad governance such 
as corruption, patronage, lack of transparency, etc. (e.g., United Nations 
Development Program, 1997). In the literature, it is possible to identify different 
elements or principles of good governance as far as public appointment 
processes are concerned. Some of these conditions refer to variables such as 
the form of the state, the ethics of politicians and the nature of power in society 
(e.g., focused, diffused or open) but they are outside the domain of this study. 
The focus of our analysis is rather the conditions that refer to organizational 
arrangements that can be put in place by public managers. Such arrangements 
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include transparency and accountability of public announcements for appointable 
positions, stakeholder engagement, and checks to detect and punish corrupt 
behaviours (e.g., Matheson et al., 2007). Our research question is the following: 
‘What are the organizational arrangements in the process of local public 
appointments that can foster the use of public appointments as a tool of good 
governance?’ 
 The relevance of our contribution has three aspects: The first is that our study 
is focused on a country (Italy) with a strong tradition of patronage and clientelism 
(Di Mascio, 2014; Kickert, 2011; Kopecký et al., 2012), similar to some other 
European countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain. The second is the 
approach and the nature of our research. We looked at the issue of public 
appointments through the lens of public management and governance. For this 
purpose, we analysed the organizational arrangements of public appointment 
processes. The third aspect of our contribution is that most of the empirical 
studies so far conducted on the topic of public appointments have focused on 
central government (e.g., Van Thiel, 2009; Carboni, 2010), whereas our study 
focuses on the local government level, explicitly recognizing the existence of 
intra- and inter-organizational appointments. 
 The article has this logical structure: in the next section, we briefly present a 
theoretical backdrop about appointments in the public sector, and this is followed 
by a section that develops our theoretical framework of analysis. The next two 
sections present the research strategy, methods and context; the final two 
sections present and discuss findings and conclusions. 
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Appointments in the public sector 
The capacity of political actors to appoint people to positions in public and semi-
public (e.g., hybrid) organizations has been labelled in the literature as patronage 
and/or public appointments. Sometimes these two words are used as synonyms; 
at other times, they are assigned different meanings. Indeed, the word 
‘patronage’ has been mostly used with a negative valence to refer to cases in 
which appointments by politicians are negative, unproductive and unable to 
improve personnel management (e.g., Mosher, 1982; Van Riper, 1958). Many 
studies have contributed to creating this negative image of patronage in the public 
sector, relating it to corruption, cronyism and nepotism. For example, Caiden 
(1991: 490) depicted patronage as a common ‘bureaupathology’ – that is, ‘ the 
vices, maladies and sickness of bureaucracy’. Roback and Vinzant (1994: 501) 
pointed out that ‘patronage is associated with staffing policies that result in 
marginally qualified people, waste and corruption’. From this perspective, 
appointments are seen as a bad governance tool that politicians use merely to 
gain support and consensus in specific electoral constituencies (Müller, 2006; 
Manzetti and Wilson, 2007; Kopecký et al., 2012). 
 However, more recently, some scholars have proposed a re-examination of 
the concept and moved away from the idea that patronage is a ‘pathological 
legacy of the past requiring condemnation and elimination’ (e.g., Bearfield, 2009: 
73). 
 In other words, making appointments is not necessarily an evil, but could 
instead be a tool of good governance. For example, appointments may create 
more alignment between political and administrative structures (e.g., Aberbach 
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and Rockman, 1998), contribute to energizing the civil service structure (Peters 
and Pierre, 2004: 11), allow for attracting talents and broadening governing 
knowledge (Flinders, 2012). They could also offer possibilities for appointing 
people who reflect societal characteristics (e.g., Flinders et al., 2012; Naff, 2001; 
Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003), or involve sections of the community with little 
interest in conventional adversarial party politics, but with interest in undertaking 
a less partisan role in public life (Flinders et al., 2011). 
 One underlying assumption of the literature is that appointments are more 
difficult for politicians to use for promoting personal or party goals, whatever they 
are (Matheson et al., 2007), when their powers to appoint an individual for a given 
position is constrained. On this issue, referring more broadly to personnel policy 
decisions, Meyer-Sahling (2006: 699-700) argued that the degree of political 
discretion2 might be constrained through two main actions:  (1) defining 
‘standards and formal procedures a minister or any other authorized set of actors 
has to follow before taking a personnel policy decision’ (Meyer-Sahling, 2006: 
699) and (2) assigning decision-making authority to different members of the 
government and/or set of administrative actors instead of attributing this power to 
a single member of the government (see also Matheson et al., 2007: 30). 
In the next section, we develop a framework for analysing public appointment 
processes. 
 
Public appointment processes: in search of a framework of 
analysis 
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As we have outlined, appointments can be potentially seen and used as a tool of 
good governance or as a tool of patronage. The position of the pendulum 
between the two extremes may also depend on procedural constraints in the 
process of public appointments; these constraints may be established through 
several organizational arrangements. In particular, the more such organizational 
arrangements are able to constrain political discretion, the more appointments 
are likely to realize the potential benefits that they are expected to offer. In this 
respect, as highlighted by Meyer-Sahling (2006), two main aspects should be 
considered: (1) the existence of standards and procedures and (2) the actor(s) 
who is (are) in charge of making public appointments. 
 As far as standards and procedures are concerned, our critical analysis of the 
literature reveals three key elements as crucial: (i) transparency of the process 
(Edwards, 2006: 4; Flinders, 2009: 551, 557), (ii) media and public awareness 
(Flinders et al. 2010; 2012) and (iii) job descriptions with professional 
requirements (Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments, OCPA, 2005: 
20). 
 Transparency of the process and media and public awareness are both 
connected with the concept of openness. Transparency is one of the main ideas 
that have informed the practices aimed at innovating public administration (Hood, 
1991). Transparency per se is considered an intrinsic value in public affairs 
(Hood, 2006; Lapsley, 2008) that allows for improving administrative as well as 
policy effectiveness (Ball, 2009). In the literature, however, transparency is 
interpreted in multiple ways. In the context of recruitment decisions, transparency 
refers to the fact that vacancies are openly advertised, potentially stimulating 
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applications from a wider group of people than just the personal connections of 
politicians in charge of making the appointment. This may also result in a 
constrained political discretion of the patron due to the higher number of people 
who might scrutinize the decision. 
 Media and public awareness concern the provision of information to the 
general public on appointments in the public sector. If governments are obliged 
to provide information to media or other stakeholders concerning their 
appointments, they are expected to garner more external pressure and be more 
careful about their decisions. In this perspective, media and public awareness are 
seen as ways to constrain political discretion (e.g., Keane, 2011). Another factor 
that can constrain political discretion in public appointments is the presence of a 
job description with educational and/or professional requirements. Some authors 
stressed that the narrow definition of relevant skills and experience can lead to 
unintended and perverse outcomes (Gatenby Sanderson, 2009; Flinders et al., 
2012). However, a general agreement seems to exist on the relevance of having 
a job description with educational and/or professional requirements for identifying 
the person for any position, thus recognizing the principle of merit3 in public 
appointments. 
 Finally, several studies (e.g., Kovac and Virant, 2013) also emphasized the 
importance of (iv) independent scrutiny led by external experts and/or an 
independent assessor in the process of public appointments, mainly for 
shortlisting candidates and/or providing recommendations to politicians before 
their choice. The independent scrutiny may also help to reduce allegations of 
corruption and nepotism (Agere, 2000). 
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 The second constraint identified as relevant by Meyer-Sahling (2006) was 
that, in terms of the power to make appointments, not only the number of political 
actors involved in the process seems to matter, but also their characteristics. 
Indeed, according to Amado (2001: 569), extending the authority of public 
appointments to more than one member of the executive body is not enough to 
provide oversight and checks in the process. In this respect, Amado pointed out 
that it is also important (v) to include members of the legislative body in the 
process of public appointments. Their involvement is considered a way to place 
‘the process on the public agenda, providing opponents an opportunity to voice 
their concerns’ (2001: 580). 
 Finally, Borgonovi (2002: 369) also mentioned the opportunity (vi) to involve 
other external actors in the public appointment process (e.g., local associations, 
universities, etc.) beyond those who belonged to institutionalized and mandated 
structures within governments. This could be seen as using public appointments 
as a way to revitalize democratic processes. The importance of stakeholder and 
citizen participation and involvement in public governance is coherent with the 
idea that broader and more inclusive processes can enhance, on the one hand, 
the external legitimacy of the decision making, and on the other hand, the 
representation of multiple constituents and stakeholders (e.g. Bingham et al., 
2005). 
 Drawing on the six elements described above, we investigated whether the 
public appointment processes studied provided organizational arrangements for 
ensuring (i) the transparency of the process, (ii) existence of a job description 
with specific educational/professional requirements, (iii) media and public 
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awareness, (iv) existence of independent scrutiny by external experts, (v) 
involvement of local councillors and/or (vi) local stakeholders in the public 
appointment process. 
 
Research strategy and methods 
We opted for a research strategy based on multiple case studies (Eisenhardt 
1989; Yin 1994) adopting a whole-of-government approach (Christensen and 
Laegreid 2007) for analysing both intra- and inter-organizational appointments in 
local government. Specifically, we investigated ten public appointment processes 
used in Italian local government organizations. This research strategy appeared 
to be the most appropriate considering the study variables. As a matter of fact, 
obtaining information about the organizational arrangements of public 
appointment processes is quite difficult due to the political sensitivity and, often, 
the secrecy around this topic. 
 We chose our cases combining three criteria: the accessibility of data, the 
geographical location and the typology of appointments. With respect to 
geographical location, we limited our analysis to local government organizations 
belonging to the same region in the north of Italy to control for contextual 
differences that are particularly significant in Italy. This region shows a high level 
of economic performance and medium to high level of social capital as compared 
to other parts of Italy (Putnam, 1993). More information about our case studies is 
provided in Table 1, where we omitted the names of the organizations involved 
in the study in order to preserve their anonymity. 
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**Insert Table 1 about here** 
 
Public appointment processes were analysed in local government organizations 
of different sizes to reflect a variety of complexities. Moreover, we investigated 
five appointments within the local government for their different roles (city 
manager, auditors (3), ombudsman) and five inter-organizational appointments 
of board members in different types of local public organizations (municipal 
corporations and local foundations) operating in different industries (culture, 
energy management, transportation and infrastructure). 
 Data were gathered and analysed from several sources: official documents of 
public organizations with the power to appoint and local public entities subjected 
to appointing powers. Furthermore, at least three informal and conversational 
semi-structured interviews were conducted in each case study, for a total of 39 
people interviewed (see Table 1 for further details of the type of actors 
interviewed); interviewees were not informed about the specific contents and 
aims of the study in order to avoid mimetic behaviour and stereotyped responses 
and they were identified by combining initial theoretical sampling with snowball 
sampling according to the emerging findings. Interviews were not audio-recorded, 
but interview notes were written up and analysed within a few days; when 
verbatim quotes are reported in the next section, they were chosen after 
consultation with the authors for their relevance and representativeness. 
 
Research context 
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In Italian local government, the appointing power is usually centralized in the 
hands of mayors. However, as noted earlier, some organizational arrangements 
in the public appointment process can be put in place to include other actors. 
Italian local government has been labelled as a clientelistic/patronage model of a 
local government system (Goldsmith, 1992: 395) and is thus assumed to be more 
inclined to party colonization (Di Mascio, 2012b; Müller 2006). Moreover, Italy is 
distanced from countries like the UK (Sancino, 2011) that have established a 
commissioner for public appointments (e.g., Denton, 2006) or have tried to 
regulate in a formal way the aspects embedded in the public appointment 
process. 
 Over the last few decades, the phenomenon of public appointments in Italy 
has increased in relevance considerably both at an intra- and inter-organizational 
level (e.g., Di Mascio, 2012b). The latest survey conducted by the Treasury found 
that Italian local governments altogether have about 29,000 shareholdings in 
about 6,500 local public entities (with different legal forms and ownership 
structures) (Dipartimento del Tesoro, 2013). Some 65% of municipal corporations 
are established in private legal forms (limited companies or joint-stock 
companies) and 35% in other legal forms (Corte dei Conti, 2012). About 30% of 
municipal corporations are in mixed public and private ownership (IRPA, 2012). 
More generally, we estimate that at least 40,000 people (with different roles) have 
been appointed to local public entities or in some internal organizational role 
(Unioncamere, 2008). 
 Even in comparative terms, the relevance of appointments in Italy is 
confirmed: Kopecký et al. (2012), reported the results of a research project on 
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practices of public appointments in 15 European countries at the central 
government level. They observed that the scale and depth of the phenomenon 
varied widely across countries, with seven countries below the mean for Europe 
as a whole (Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and UK) 
and eight countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Spain) at or slightly above the average value for Europe. 
 Contextualizing the study of appointments in the public sector, however, is 
very important. In this perspective, one of the main differences between northern 
and southern Europe lies in the role of politicians as masters of appointed 
officials; one important difference between Italy and other countries, especially in 
northern Europe, is indeed the impossibility in Italy to appoint politicians to boards 
or managerial roles in municipal corporations. Finally, a study from the OECD 
(Matheson et al., 2007) on formal and informal restrictions and external oversight 
for political involvement in appointments (senior staffing in the study) has placed 
Italy as a country characterized by the presence of mainly formal types of 
restrictions and external oversight. This situation differs again from other 
countries such as Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon ones where informal 
restrictions and informal external oversight also play a relevant role. 
 
Findings 
The first variable of analysis we investigated was the transparency of the 
appointment process itself; specifically, we operationalized transparency through 
investigating whether or not a public advertisement had been posted. We noted 
that public advertisements for the positions to be filled were guaranteed in seven 
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out of ten cases. This result confirmed that, in the remaining three cases, the 
literature on covert politics and hidden public appointment processes touched the 
reality of our empirical context. As an interviewee said: 'A public advertisement is 
placed only if it is expected by the law’ (interview M5). This seems to confirm the 
legalist approach of Italian public administration, where behaviours are generally 
guided by the idea of conforming to the law.  
 Looking more analytically into the case studies, we found that the three cases 
for which the public advertisement was not posted were all inter-organizational 
appointments. This could depend on the fact that the local public entities (such 
as, for example, local quangos, foundations and/or municipal corporations) are 
not always required by administrative law to make public advertisements; 
however, this result seems to confirm that further accountability mechanisms 
should be provided and used in inter-organizational settings (e.g., Almqvist et al. 
2013). This could avoid some risks such as diminishing publicness of public 
services (Haque 2001) and of democratic uncoupling (Klijn and Skelcher 2007); 
it might also allow for the identification of the boundaries and the different 
dimensions of public accountability (Luke 2010). 
 As for the job description of the position to be filled by public appointment, we 
investigated whether there were specific educational background/training and/or 
some professional requirements to be satisfied for an applicant to be eligible for 
the appointment. In seven case studies, we found that there were such 
requirements, but in three of those seven cases we did not find any detailed job 
description with some measurable criteria to be satisfied (which is why in Table 
2 we put an (‘x’) in the row); specifically, in these cases the criteria were generic, 
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leaving space for any kind of interpretation and making impossible any clear and 
objective comparison among the job candidates (‘The problem is that the criteria 
are neither clearly stated nor possibly operationalized and measured in advance, 
so all can be very discretional’, interview P6a). 
 In three of the four other case studies with job descriptions (all the intra-
organizational appointments for the auditor role – Nucleo di Valutazione), a 
degree with some training in management was required (thus, not necessarily in 
management, but with some modules/exams within it that were related to 
management). In the remaining case (ombudsman) candidates eligible for the 
appointments were required to have a degree in administrative or public law. 
 According to those interviewed, the request in the latter case for a specific 
qualification made a significant difference in preventing the abuse of power by 
politicians by more clearly targeting the professional community (in this case, 
lawyers and/or experts in law) to which the position referred. This did not happen 
in the other three cases where, as confirmed by one mayor interviewed (P2a), 
’professional and educational requirements [university training in management] 
were included for addressing a bureaucratic fulfilment and for giving a stronger 
legitimacy to the appointment, but I already knew who I wanted to appoint before 
starting the process’. In this respect, a public manager interviewed said, ‘It doesn’t 
make any sense spending time writing a public advertisement if you cannot do a 
specific job description to attract the best candidates because you actually know 
that position has to be used by your mayor to reward someone from his personal 
constituencies’ (M3). This statement clearly pointed to the use of appointments 
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as a tool of organizational and/or party patronage (Kopecký et al., 2012) with the 
effect of producing a negative perception of the overall fairness of the process. 
 As far as the media and public awareness are concerned, we found that media 
reported news about the public appointments in question in daily newspapers, 
websites and/or in TV programmes in four case studies. However, this did not 
happen for a proactive role of public managers in targeting the public 
advertisement, but rather because there was high media attention to those 
(appointable) positions in relation to their remuneration. Moreover, other 
interviewees drew our attention to another important aspect: ‘A lot of the people 
working in our municipalities [e.g., councillors, employees, managers] and a lot 
of citizens don’t know what positions are eligible for public appointments’ (M2). 
 With regard to our fourth variable of analysis (independent scrutiny), we 
investigated whether or not external actors beyond those with the power to 
appoint were involved in the selection of the candidates; this was the case in four 
out of the ten case studies. 
 
INSERT ABOUT HERE TABLE 2 
 
More specifically, we observed that in cases 2 and 10, an external panel of 
experts was ad hoc appointed for shortlisting the candidates. The task of the 
external panel was to screen all of the candidates and identify a shortlist of eligible 
candidates. Afterwards, the mayors were free to choose from among them. 
In case 3, there was a panel (independent appointing committee) made up of 
experts elected by the local council. That panel was in charge for a term of three 
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years with the task of selecting and shortlisting candidates for all of the eligible 
inter-organizational appointments. This solution seemed particularly interesting 
because it also outlined the possibility, in the context of Italian local government, 
of creating new organizational bodies within the municipality with the specific task 
to oversee, in this case, all of the inter-organizational public appointments. 
 Finally, in case 9, the independent scrutiny was conducted by the city council, 
which promoted several hearings for interviewing candidates: after all the 
hearings, every city councillor voted for their preferred candidate, resulting in the 
candidate with the most votes being appointed by the mayor. 
 As far as the involvement of councillors and/or external local stakeholders in 
the public appointment processes investigated, our findings show that local 
councillors were involved in two cases, whereas external stakeholders were 
involved only in case 3. In this respect, it is interesting to note an internal relation 
in our findings: local councillors and external stakeholders where involved in 
public appointment processes when an independent scrutiny of the candidates 
by experts was also provided. 
 The last line of Table 2 indicates the perceived outcomes of the processes of 
public appointment investigated. We coded the perceived outcomes after 
analysis of all the qualitative data and after consultation among all the 
researchers to determine which of three possible options had been applied: 
patronage, good governance or mixed. 
 In this respect, it is interesting to note that, according to our data, processes 
of public appointments where there was independent scrutiny were not perceived 
as patronage. In particular, two of them were perceived as good governance and 
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the other two as mixed (some elements of good governance and some of 
patronage). Good governance (in terms of perception of the overall integrity and 
fairness of the process of public appointment among the main actors) was found 
in processes of public appointments with independent scrutiny, but also when 
local councillors and local stakeholders were engaged in the processes. 
 
Conclusions 
Public appointments are very much part of the present and future (Bearfield 2009: 
73) of public administration. Their democratic relevance can be easily understood 
on consideration of how much public money may be managed in some cases by 
appointed personnel. 
The attention that several countries such as the UK, Canada and New Zealand 
(Edwards 2006:1) have given to ensuring openness, competitiveness and 
transparency in public appointment processes demonstrates the sensitivity of this 
matter. There may thus be important implications in terms of the integrity of the 
public governance processes and citizens’ trust in public institutions. 
 The literature has usually associated appointments in the public sector with 
negative phenomena (e.g., corruption and nepotism); however, more recently, 
some scholars have recognized the potential of appointments, for example, in 
involving new people in public organizations and/or attracting talents. This does 
not mean that politicians should not be able to make decisions that exercise their 
powers of appointment (Flinders and Matthews, 2010: 651), but that some 
organizational arrangements can help to use public appointments as a tool of 
good governance rather than as a tool of patronage. 
20 
 
 In this paper, we analysed several intra- and inter-organizational public 
appointment processes in the context of Italian local government, investigating 
what organizational arrangements have been employed and what their effect has 
been on the overall public appointment process in terms of perceptions of the 
actors involved. We found that the involvement of other actors (local councillors 
and stakeholders) in the public appointment process beyond those with the power 
to appoint (the mayor) and the presence of independent scrutiny seem to be more 
relevant than other organizational arrangements in helping to perceive the use of 
appointments as a tool of good governance. In other words, transparency of 
public advertisements, job descriptions and specific educational and/or 
professional requirements and media and public awareness seem to be not 
enough in terms of perceptions of integrity and fairness of the process unless 
accompanied by independent scrutiny and the engagement of other actors 
beyond those with the power to appoint. 
 While these findings clearly need to be further explored, some implications of 
this study can be discussed from policy, managerial and research perspectives. 
In terms of policy implications, our study confirms the importance of putting public 
appointments more clearly on the public agenda and of ensuring transparency of 
all of the eligible positions (for example, the fact that inter-organizational 
appointments in three case studies were made with any forms of transparency 
should be seriously considered by policy makers). However, the study also 
indicates that in contexts such as Italy, characterized by a permeated legalist 
approach and a high risk for party permeation and corruption (Youngblood 
Coleman 2014), rather than with standards and procedures, the good 
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governance potential of public appointments might be better addressed otherwise 
— that is, through organizational incentives aimed at providing independent 
scrutiny and at involving actors other than politicians in the public appointment 
process. 
 In terms of managerial implications, the study sheds light on the fact that, in 
dealing with public appointment processes, public managers should expand their 
responsibilities and tasks and be asked to perform new public governance roles 
(Osborne 2006), for example: 
• by providing new mechanisms and dimensions of accountability related to 
the specific characteristics of the inter-organizational and networked 
context in which local governments operate (e.g., Almquist et al. 2013); 
• by developing more advanced techniques of human resource 
management for using appointments as a way of attracting talents or for 
re-engaging sections of the community towards public matters; 
• by managing relationships with media and external stakeholders in order 
to promote public awareness and more inclusive public appointment 
processes. 
 In terms of research implications, our aim in this article has been to increase 
knowledge on the issue of public appointments, adopting a public management 
and governance perspective as suggested by McTavish and Piper (2007). In this 
respect, even if it is clear that the research around public appointments should 
be interdisciplinary, our paper demonstrated that studying organizational 
arrangements in public appointment processes through public management and 
governance lenses is possible and even needed. 
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 The main limitations of our research consisted in the limited number of case 
studies investigated and in the exploratory nature of the study; however, coherent 
with case study research, we were not interested in statistical generalization, but 
in investigating relations between the use of some organizational arrangements 
and the perceived outcomes of appointment processes. 
 Finally, we believe that public management and governance research in the 
current era cannot neglect the relevance of public appointment processes in 
terms of their democratic implications. Researchers should therefore continue to 
study the role of public managers and identify which organizational arrangements 
can exploit the good governance potential of public appointments and prevent the 
abuse of power by politicians. In this perspective, future studies may provide 
further and more refined frameworks of analysis and apply them across different 
contexts. 
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Notes 
1 McTavish and Piper (2007: 146) warned explicitly about the lack of public management studies 
on public appointments: ‘the system for monitoring, regulating and reporting on the way in which 
appointments in public organizations are made is a relatively neglected area of public 
management’. 
2. Political discretion has been defined by Meyer-Sahling (2006: 699-700) as ‘the extent to which 
the government of the day, or its ministers, has the possibility to exercise personnel policy 
authority and the extent to which the exercise of this authority is subject to specific procedural 
constraints’. 
3 Merit is defined in different ways depending on the context in which it is being used. With specific 
reference to hiring decisions, merit implies that officials are selecting on the basis of qualifications, 
competences and abilities for the position (Weber, 1968). 
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Table 1. Case studies description 
 
Process of public 
appointment 
 
Organization 
Intra- vs. inter-
organizational 
appointment 
Persons 
interviewed 
1  Board member  Joint-stock company 
(energy management) 
 
INTER P = 2; M= 1; E= 
1; A= 2 
2  City manager   Local government 
 
INTRA P= 2; M= 1 
3  Board member   Joint stock company 
 (energy management) 
 
INTER P= 3 M= 1 
4  Auditor   Local government INTRA P= 2; A= 1 
5  Auditor   Foundation 
(cultural management) 
INTER P= 1; A= 1; M= 1 
6  Board member   Municipal corporation 
(transport and 
infrastructure) 
INTER P= 2; O= 1 
7  Board member   Foundation 
(cultural management) 
INTER P= 1; A= 2 
8  Auditor   Local government INTRA P= 2; E= 1 
9  Ombudsman  Local government INTRA P= 4; E= 2; A= 1; 
M= 1 
10  Auditor   Local government INTRA P= 1; M= 1; A= 1 
 
Source: AIDA Bureau van Dijk, 2012. 
Legend: P= politician; M= manager; E= employee; A= appointee; O= other actors. 
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